Posted by Abu Iyaad
Monday, Nov 04 2024
Filed under Fiqh & ʿIbādah
The subject matter of the verification of the basis of the ruling—taḥqīq al-manāt—has been addressed by jurists such as Imām al-Shāṭibī (رحمه الله) among others since it relates to the correct application of legislative rulings known from the texts to issues and situations upon their actual and investigated realities. Legislative rulings are known from texts and mentally grasped, so they are known as universal rulings, but then they have to be applied to real-life situations and scenarios, so their correct application requires knowledge of the presence or absence of the basis of the ruling in the situation at hand.
A simple example is that the legislative ruling that intoxicants are unlawful is known from the texts. However, to apply this ruling to a particular substance or fluid requires verification of the basis of the ruling, which is the intoxicating quality. So if that is established and ascertained, then the ruling can be applied to that substance or fluid.
Linguistically taḥqīq means, verification, ascertainment, establishment, to pinpoint, to find out, to establish the true nature of something. It is to make something verified and established. Linguistically, manāṭ is that which is suspended by something else, being conditional and dependent upon it. And in terms of jurisprudence, it means the basis, cause, reason (ʿillah) to which a ruling is tied, attached.
Putting these two together, then it means to verify that the basis, reason or cause to which a legislative ruling is tied or suspended is present in a thing or an issue or a situation, so that it becomes known that the legislative ruling applies to it.
As for “ijtihad”, it refers to effort expended in order to acquire knowledge of a legislative ruling from the Book and the Sunnah. Such a ruling could be found in the texts, or it could be derived from general principles found in the texts along with the use of analogy (qiyās) in relation to new issues and situations for which no direct text exists.
However, there is another arena of ijtihād and that is taḥqīq al-manāt (verification of the basis), and this does not require expertise in Arabic or knowledge of the objectives (maqāṣid) of the Sharīʿah. It simply requires knowledge of the subject matter at hand, in order to verify the presence or absence of the basis to which a legislative ruling is connected. This matter is explained below.
Imām al-Shāṭibī, in this part of the book, explains that ijtihād can be connected to a number of things, either to the texts, or more broadly speaking, to meanings, or to making verification of a basis to which a ruling may be applied. He discusses this latter issue in this section.
Imām al-Shāṭibī (رحمه الله) said in al-Muwāfaqāt, Arabic text is further below:[1]
The making of ijtihād [in a matter] may be connected to verification (taḥqīq) of the basis (manāṭ, that upon which the ruling rests) and hence, knowledge of the objectives of the legislator (maqāṣid al-shāriʿ) is not required for that, just as knowledge of the Arabic language is not required for that.
This is because the objective from this ijtihād is simply to have knowledge of the subject matter upon its [reality]. What is required therein is knowledge of that without which the subject cannot be known otherwise, wherein knowledge of it is desired.
Thus, it is necessary for a mujtahid to be knowledgeable and expend effort in that aspect from which he is looking at [the matter] so that he can apply the legislative ruling (al-ḥukm al-sharʿiyy) in agreement with the requirement [of the facts of the matter].
An illustration of this point is given as follows:
There is a legislative ruling that the ill person, or the one whose illness will be prolonged due to use of water, is permitted to make tayammum. So knowledge of this legislative ruling exists and is understood, and when we want to know this ruling in relation to an individual, whether he is granted that concession or not, then we do not need have knowledge and expertise in the Arabic language, nor to have knowledge of the objectives of the Sharīʿah in the subject matter of tayammum itself, let alone other broader objectives of the Sharīʿah (in its legislations). Rather, the only thing binding upon us to know, through the path that leads us to it, is whether harm will be caused to that person through the use of water, so that the manāṭ, basis of the ruling, can be ascertained, whether it is present or not. So this has got nothing to do with the other two affairs, that of being skilled in the Arabic language or knowing the objectives of the Sharīʿah. The only thing required here is what is known through experience by that individual concerning himself, or those similar to him, or through the corroboration of a doctor.
Al-Shāṭibī continues:
This is like the ḥadīth scholar (muḥaddith) who knows the states and paths of the chains of narration, what is authentic and weak from them, and [knowing] what he can use as proof from their texts from what he cannot use. This is considered his ijtihād with respect to that [subject matter] of which he is acquainted, irrespective of whether he is a scholar of Arabic or not, or is acquainted with the objectives of the Sharīʿah or not.
Likewise, the reciter [of the Qurʾān] who knows how to convey various reading modes. [Likewise], the craftsman in knowing defects of merchandise, and the doctor in knowledge of illnesses and defects, and market experts in their knowledge of valuating merchandise and how defects occur in them, the counter (accountant) who checks the validity of division, and the surveyor in estimating land.
All of this and whatever is similar to it through which the basis of the legislative ruling (manāṭ al-ḥukm al-sharʿiyy) is known does not require knowledge of Arabic, nor knowledge of Sharīʿah objectives, though the combination of that comprises perfection in the mujtahid.
Given that when ijtihād is made in relation to legislative rulings, and it can be made in connection to different areas as already mentioned above, such as in relation to words and meanings, then in relation to this particular matter, which is verification of the basis of the ruling (taḥqīq al-manāṭ), one does not need to be equipped with all those requirements of ijtihād, such as expertise in the Arabic language and knowledge of the objectives of the Sharīʿah.
If this had not been the case, and these requirements were made a condition in making verification of the basis of the ruling, then the legislative duties would never be fulfilled.
So for example, if it was made a requirement for a doctor or a specialist, before he says that a particular drug, medication or treatment is beneficial or harmful, proven or unproven, valid or invalid, that he has to be equipped with the tools of ijtihād before he can make that determination, then this would lead to a situation where it would be hard to apply legislative rulings to verified realities, because we have now specified such conditions and requirements and made it so hard, that there are very few people who can actually make verification of the basis of a ruling before any ruling can be made known and applied.[2]
Al-Shāṭibī continues, wherein he provides three lines of evidence for this:
The evidence for that is what has preceded, which is [firstly] that if it was necessary [for a mujtahid to be equipped with all the tools of ijtihād], then no mujtahid would be found except rarely. Rather, it would be practically impossible, and if there was one found, it would be extraordinary (a violation of the norm), such as Ādam (عليه السلام) when Allāh taught him all of the names, without him having any speech.
Also, [secondly], if knowledge of the objectives of the Sharīʿah [and of Arabic] was binding therein, then it would be binding in every [type of] knowledge and craft, [meaning] that they cannot be known except with knowledge of that [Sharīʿah objectives and Arabic], because knowledge of the objectives of the Sharīʿah has been made binding for having knowledge of [those other fields], and that is false... For sciences have been acquired and are found with those ignorant of the Sharīʿah and of Arabic, and with the disbelievers who reject the Sharīʿah.
A third angle is that the scholars (ʿulamā) have never ceased following (yuqallidūn) those who are not jurists (fuquhā) in these issues. They [those followed by the scholars who are not jurists] are only considered people of knowledge (ahl al-maʿrifah) [in relation to these affairs] due to what they have been followed in in particular, which is taqlīd [taking the view of others] in verification of the basis [for the ruling] (manāṭ).
Scholars take the views and opinions of others in fields of expertise in which they do not have knowledge and on that basis, they give fatāwā to explain the legislative rulings, upon the information provided. And those whom they follow are only considered Ahl al-Maʿrifah (people of knowledge, expertise) in relation to those specific affairs in which they have been followed, which is in the matter of verification of the basis of the ruling. Note that people of worldly specialisms are considered to be Ahl al-Dhikr, mentioned in the verse "Ask the people of knowledge if you do not know." (21:7-).
Al-Shāṭibī continues:
So the conclusion is that the only thing binding in this ijtihād is knowledge of the objectives of the mujtahid with respect to it, just as it is the same in the first two [situations] [i.e. ijtihād from texts, and ijtihād from meanings].
Thus, ijtihād with respect to derivation from Sharīʿah terms [words] requires knowledge of the objectives of the Arabic [language] and ijtihād with respect to Sharīʿah meanings requires knowledge of the objectives of the Sharīʿah, and ijtihād in the basis [manāṭ] of rulings requires knowledge of the objectives of that basis, from the angle from which the ruling is connected to it, not from any other angle, and that is apparent.
End of the passage from al-Shāṭibī (رحمه الله).
Arabic Text
Notes
01 In the sections before this al-Shāṭibī explained that ijtihād can be related to texts in which case knowledge of Arabic is necessary, and if it is related to knowledge of what is beneficial and harmful (the maṣāliḥ and mafāsid), then knowledge of Arabic is not necessary, rather the only thing necessary is knowledge of the objectives of the Sharīʿah as it relates to those beneficial and harmful things. So this is ijtihād on the basis of meanings.
He (رحمه الله) said:[3]
If ijtihād is connected to derivation from the texts, then the condition of knowledge of Arabic is necessary. And if it is connected to meanings of [what are] beneficial and harmful things (al-maṣāliḥ wal-mafāsid), without the texts necessitating [those meanings] or which are already accepted by the person making ijtihād as being in the texts, then knowledge of Arabic is not required in that. Rather, all that is required is specific knowledge of the objectives of the legislator from the Sharīʿah, in general and in detail.
The evidence for knowledge of Arabic not being a condition is that knowledge of Arabic affords [knowledge] of the implications of the words in accordance to what is understood from Sharīʿah terms, and the terms used by the legislator [in turn] afford their requisite meanings in Arabic.
Thus [from this perspective] it is not possible for one who is not an Arab to understand the language of the Arabs, just as mutual understanding is not possible between an Arab, Berber, Roman, or Hebrew until every one of them knows the requisites of the language of his companion.
But as for pure meanings [in themselves], then the intelligent people [of all languages] share in their understanding. Thus one language is not specific in that regard as opposed others. Therefore, whoever understood the objectives of the Sharīʿah in institution of laws, he has reached the level of having knowledge of them, even if his understanding was through the route of translation in a foreign language.
Hence, there is no difference between him and between the one who understood them in the Arabic language. For that reason, the mujtihadūn apply legislative rulings to verbal [descriptions of] occurrences that are Arabic, and they make consideration of the meanings, they do not make consideration through the words, in many of the situations that arise [nawāzil].
He explained that whereas the first type, which is looking at texts and extracting rulings from them, knowing what they mean and how the words, grammatically speaking, point to those meanings, then this requires knowledge of Arabic. However, as it relates to meanings, then this is shared by people of all languages, even if those meanings are acquired through translation, and ijtihād can be made and legislative rulings can be applied to situations through consideration of the meaning, irrespective of what language it came from.
So these are two types, ijtihād on the basis of the texts, which is to extract what is in the text, to know what is a legislative ruling. Then there is ijtihād on the basis of meanings, and this is more general. This is shared in by all people, in the sense that if a Muslim who speaks only English, he knows that whatever intoxicates is unlawful. This is through meaning, and this person does not have to know Arabic and does not need to know how the texts and their words, grammatically speaking, point to this particular meaning and ruling.
Then al-Shaṭibī speaks about a third type, which is our subject here, which is ijtihād as it relates to verifying the basis of the ruling (taḥqīq al-manāṭ). So this is where investigation is made to ensure that the description or quality to which the ruling has been attached in the Sharīʿah is actually found in the issue or situation at hand.
This is something purely investigative and does not require knowledge of Arabic and nor knowledge of the objectives of the Sharīʿah.
02 Al-Shāṭibī gives examples of the craftsman in his craft, the doctor, the market expert, the surveyor and so on, and how they all have knowledge in their disciplines and how they can make verification and ascertainment in their fields, in order to identify and verify the basis upon which a ruling may apply. These people do not need to know the Arabic language, nor do they need to know the objectives of the Sharīʿah behind the particular ruling that might apply. They just need knowledge of the issue at hand, and when the basis (manāṭ) has been verifiably established, then the text or the ruling that is already known, applies.
03 He then gives three lines of evidence for that, which is that: Firstly, if it was required for every mujtahid to be equipped with all the tools of ijtihād, in every ijtihād, no mujtahid would be found, except very rarely. Secondly, if having knowledge of the objectives of the Sharīʿah was made binding in that particular issue, then it would be made binding for all disciplines and fields, but this is not so, as crafts and sciences are acquired by Muslims ignorant of the Sharīʿah and disbelievers who reject the Sharīʿah. And thirdly, we know that scholars follow others in verification of the basis of the ruling, because they do not have expertise in those fields themselves, so they have to take these affairs on trust, and thus, in those fields they make taqlīd of others.
04 Then al-Shāṭibī explains—given the three scenarios of ijtihād he is discussing—that in the first type, ijtihād based on words [in the texts] requires knowledge of Arabic and its objectives. And ijtihād based on meanings [which can be in any language], that requires knowledge of the objectives of the Sharīʿah. And ijtihād with respect to the third, which is verification of the basis of the ruling, that requires knowledge of that subject matter in itself, and does not require knowledge of the Arabic language or the objectives of the Sharīʿah.
An Illustration
It is known through the texts in both wording and meaning, from ijtihād therein, that the ruling on medicinal treatment in principle is permissible (mubāḥ) or recommended (mustaḥabb) and likewise the objectives of the Sharīʿah therein are known (such as preserving health). Arrival at these rulings is through words (the texts relating to medicine and their indications in the Arabic language) and meanings (objectives of the Sharīʿah).
On the basis of this, scholars have explained these rulings and objectives and made clear what is found in the Sharīʿah, and the principles that apply in knowledge of a ruling. From them is that for something to be permissible, in terms of medical treatment, it has to be a lawful substance, it can’t be unlawful (ḥarām), it has to be shown to be a means, either definitively, or have a strong likelihood of being so (see here), and that its benefit must outweigh the harm, and it must be based on credible evidence, not delusions, conjectures and false claims.
Now all of these affairs have been derived on the basis of ijtihād that is connected to words (the words of the Sharīʿah in its texts) and meanings (the objectives of the Sharīʿah). So this is the realm of scholars who are equipped with these tools of ijtihād.
Let’s take an example from Shaykh Ibn ʿUthaymīn (رحمه الله) when asked about taking vaccines and whether this negates reliance:[4]
Vaccination against diseases, if it is of known benefit, then this is from the means, similar to when a person shields himself from cold before it comes. As for when it is just conjectures and delusions, then no.
So from here, there is the ijtihād that relates to taḥqīq al-manāṭ, verification of the basis of a ruling. Now the scholar himself may investigate that by seeking the opinions of those whom he trusts, since he has no knowledge or expertise in that field, if that was necessary for the situation at hand. But here, in this example, a scholar has given a conditional answer in which he alludes to verification of the basis of the ruling.
So for the one who is a doctor, a specialist, and he has knowledge of that particular medication (in this case a vaccine), and makes verification in the matter, then the ruling becomes clear. Or to the person who asked the question, he goes and makes verification regarding the basis of the ruling. So if the benefit is known and proven through credible, reliable evidence (manufacturers are honest, trustworthy, truthful, have a good track record, and benefit is proven objectively by confirmed experience and/or genuine, valid scientific research), then the ruling is permissibility and it is from reliance, as the scholar explained. And if not, and all we have is unproven or false claims, lies, conjectures or delusions, after careful scrutiny, then it is not permissible and it is not from reliance.
Now here, because the ijtihād is based on verification of the basis of the ruling, then it is not required that the doctor, or the person in question be an expert in the Arabic language or have knowledge of the objectives of the Sharīʿah and other tools of ijtihād. All that is needed is verification of the basis of the ruling, so that the ruling itself becomes clear in that particular situation.
To see more examples see: The Scholars Defer to Specialists in Matters of Medicine
Some of these affairs can be complex and ongoing, wherein realities do not become clear except after months or years, in which case it is absolutely necessary that scrutiny and objective research and analysis continue. It could have been the case that rulings were initially given based upon the limited knowledge available at the time, and as such those rulings have to be reconsidered in light of new information.
The example of those who want to hinder people from making verification of the basis (taḥqīq al-manāṭ) in certain arenas and subject matters in which they have knowledge, research and expertise is like those people who may have tried to stop researchers and scientists from making known the harms of tobacco for example, or mercury as a medicine, for whatever reason or motive that might have been.
Upon this attitude, we would never have known that smoking tobacco is unlawful, had dissenting voices not made clear that it is harmful to health. Likewise the use of mercury and arsenic as medicines, which was very common, that they are harmful and were being used as snake-oil catch-all medicines for a long time, being detrimental to health, and examples of this are plenty.
Footnotes
1. Al-Muwāfaqāt (Dār Ibn ʿAffān, 1417) 5/128-130.2. Likewise, a scholar does not have to be an expert in worldly knowledge and sciences for him to give a fatwā in issues connected to them. The details and facts of the matter are simply presented to him, and if he requires verification of the basis of the ruling in a particular scenario, he can take the view and opinion of a trusted authority before giving fatwā.
3. Some pages earlier, (5/124-125).
4. Refer to: //abuiyaad.com/a/scholars-medicine-specialists .
