Resources on Rebellion, Sedition and Secession (Splitting a Nation)

Ahl al-Sunnah Venerate the Sunnah and Its Foundations

AHL AL-SUNNAH venerate the foundations of the Sunnah, hence the name. When they are violated and the perpetrators—who may ascribe to Salafiyyah—put up resistance and adduce false arguments and doubts to justify the violations (ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī, Asʿad al-Zaʿtarī, Ṣalāḥ Kantoush), it is a duty to defend the Sunnah, since their doubts may persist and affect others, especially in the modern era of rapid communication where individuals acquire students, followers and supporters in many other countries. From the greatest of those foundations are those that relate to rulership, obedience, rebellion and sedition, which are political events and occurrences in which it is a must to separate the legislated politics from the blameworthy politics. Indeed, these were the very same issues that surfaced in the 1990s within geopolitical settings, and in the aftermath of which, Salafiyyah and the Salafī methodology became purified and separated from false ideas and principles regarding rulership, rebellion, criticism and praise, ḥizbiyyah and so on (refer to: “al-Quṭbiyyah”, and “Madārik al-Nadhar”).

The ḥadīth cited above and what is similar is from revealed guidance that applies to real life situations and is not mere decoration for books, lessons or lectures.

Throughout the ages the scholars have applied such texts to events and occurrences in order to demonstrate how these things play out in real life, often with layers of complexity, how people are deceived (or deceive themselves) and drawn into such affairs, and how this guidance protects the beneficial interests of the servant and the land.

This is part and parcel of teaching and clarifying the Sunnah and is not “occupying people with blameworthy politics”. Further, these types of events are tribulations by which people are tested, separated and distinguished.

So when claimants to Salafiyyah come with doubts such as distinguishing between an internal rebellion from within the power structure of a nation and an external rebellion from outside the country, or using what happened between ʿAlī and Muʿāwiyah (رضي الله عنهما) to justify complicity in rebellion, sedition and secession, or when rebellions against legitimate authority are reframed as worldly power struggles in which the legitimate authority is not to be sided with and supported, and that Muslim nations are still colonised and not applying the religion, thereby providing ideological grounds for justifying rebellion, and what is similar, then this is undermines the foundations of the Sunnah, and comprise gross violations in methodology (and even creed) which cannot be left alone.

In such situations, the people of truth do not resort to speaking with generalities and ambiguities, or mention texts without explaining what and to whom they relate to and how, or cite statements of scholars on the subject without providing clarity as to how the advice and guidance of the scholars apply to the current tribulation, and where and with whom the truth lies, and identifying those upon error and falsehood and so on.

This is not the way of Ahl al-Sunnah at all.

Ahl al-Sunnah take clear, open and timely positions in these types of events because they intersect with and are inseparable from these foundations of the Sunnah which are from the affairs of creed, especially when doubts, misconceptions and false principles are spread by those who fall into violations and have not responded positively to advice and correction. Rather, with stubbornness, resentment, aggression, and character assassination against the rightful critic(s).

Therefore, in pursuit of the Sharīʿah objective, Ahl al-Sunnah join hands and raise their voices in support of those critics who clarify and defend the truth after the era of advice and patience has been exhausted. This is in order to drown the voices of falsehood so that the common folk are swayed towards the voice of truth, the fitnah is extinguished and the unity of Ahl al-Sunnah is preserved.^[2]

A good practical illustration of the difference between those who truly venerate the Sunnah and those who call to it with the tongue but in practical reality violate it or care not that it is being violated is what happened in South Yemen of sedition, rebellion and attempted secession, and then presenting feeble doubts to portray it upon other than its true reality.

The Intersection of Geopolitics and the Foundations of the Sunnah

There are designs around the peninsula (al-Jazīrah) wherein footholds are being created through secessions and rebellions in Southern Yemen, Somalia and Sudan, and that is is part of the longterm agenda of the Zionists and their collaborators. At the same time the Rāfiḍah represented by the Ḥouthīs also have their designs. And if the affairs were not bad enough, the Khārijites are also present.

The policy of the coalition led by Saudi Arabia is to maintain a united Southern Yemen (and eventually all of Yemen) for reasons of security and stability and to counter those agendas. Maintaining a united Southern Yemen is a national security concern, and it is the best way to keep the Rāfīdī, Khārijī and Zionist threats contained. However, a rebellious secessionist group led by ʿAidrūs al-Zubaydī (Southern Transitional Council, STC) and the misguided rebel, Hānī bin Burayk worked against those regional security policies (with external help from foreign interests).

Hence, the fitnah concerns a traiterous rebel leader, a socialist, democratic military man, a political faction (ḥizb), a number of shaykhs, and ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī. They were complicit to varying degrees in the attempt to split a nation that was already split into two due to the Iranian-backed Ḥouthīs. They went against the fatwā of Shaykh Rabīʿ to remain behind the Saudi coalition (after behaving treacherously towards him) and likewise, they went against the Saudi government and its regional security policies.

To justify their alignment with and support of the rebel faction, they say that they are fighting the Ḥouthīs, Irhābīs and Ikhwānīs. However, so is the Saudi-led coalition, but through the objective and mechanism of the unity of the state (for broader geopolitical objectives), whereas, this group have been deceived and misled by local political ambitions which have prevented them from seeing the bigger picture and as a result, they have got entangled with a rebellious faction, and are shielding themselves through false principles and ideas which effectively justify rebellion.

In the ḥadīth of ʿArjafah bin Sharāhīl (رضي الله عنه) related by Muslim, the Prophet (صلى الله عليه وسلم) said:^[3]

Shaykh Rabīʿ bin Hādī (رحمه الله) said:^[4]

Based on this revealed guidance, this Prophetic command and this foundation of the Sunnah, Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥudhayfī expended efforts in advising the people regarding the aḥzāb (political factions) and their activities which serve to weaken and split the nation. He called them to adhere to the Jamāʿah, behind legitimate authority and the Saudi coalition. Sadly, he was reviled for it by those whom he thought would venerate the Sunnah and place it before their own ambitions. Instead, they became his adversaries and fell into oppression. He was belittled and humiliated and his writings were mockingly dismissed as writings not even children would write.

From the major violations that took place include:

❌ complicity in rebellion and sedition,
❌ fighting against legitimate authority,
❌ supporting aḥzāb in their blameworthy politics,
❌ treachery and duplicity towards senior scholars regarding matters of war and bloodshed,
❌ accepting wealth from traitors and maintaining secret ties with them, and
❌ inventing false principles to downplay rebellion and sedition.

In addition to the above there are other serious danger signals from those who fell into these affairs:

❌ accommodating those who accuse al-Albānī of agreeing with the Murjiʾah,
❌ accommodating those who prohibit the invoking of mercy for senior Salafī scholars,
❌ oppressive tabdīʿ of Salafīs upon the way of the Ḥaddādiyyah,
❌ praise and defence of innovators upon the way of the Mumayyiʿah,
❌ inventing false principles in methodology, and
❌ splitting Ahl al-Sunnah in many countries across the world through the instigation of tribulations.

From the main instigators and facilitators of these tribulations is ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī who is a notorious figure with followers and supporters across the world, many of them are loyal graduates and students, often fanatical, who are vocal in his defence and engage in fierce attacks against those who expose his deviation and corruption.^[5]

The truth (ḥaqq) in this matter is with Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥudhayfī who has been wronged, not in any trivial matter, but for venerating and calling to the Sunnah, to the fatwā of senior scholars (in matters of war and bloodshed) and to the regional security and stability policies of Saudī Arabia, all in conformity with revealed guidance in the ḥadīth of Allāh’s Messenger (صلى الله عليه وسلم).

However, in order to divert away from the foundational issue(s) at the core of the dispute, ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī and his soldiers mobilise to character assassinate the critic(s), and they rely upon lies, fabrications, (or even genuine errors that in no way reflect deviation in foundations). Packaging all these things together, they manufacture outrage and embroil people in these side issues to turn people’s eyes, ears, hearts and minds away from the core, foundational matter in which their errors are plain and manifest.

In the midst of all of this, if there is stubborn opposition, counter-refutations with falsehood, and much confusion and doubt among people, then it is required to support the truth and establish justice in pursuit of Sharīʿah objectives.

The Obligation of Aiding the Truth Against Error, Falsehood and Oppression

Shaykh Rabīʿ bin Hādi (رحمه الله) said:^[6]

Shaykh Rabīʿ also said:^[7]

Shaykh Rabīʿ also said:^[8]

Shaykh Bin Baz (رحمه الله) said in his lecture on the position of a believer in tribulations:^[9]

Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyyah (رحمه الله) said:^[10]

In light of the statements of these scholars, when the truth is clear, it is obligatory to aid the truth and to say clearly and openly, without any hesitation, that the truth is with Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥudhayfī, who aided and defended it, and that his adversaries (Shaykh al-Bukhārī, ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī and his group) are upon error and oppression from which they must recant.

So those who hear the above ḥadīth of Allah’s Messenger (صلى الله عليه وسلم) regarding secession and sedition which was not revealed as guidance and law except for situations like those involving al-Zubaydī, Hānī Burayk, and the STC forces in South Yemen, and resent that the truth be made clear by applying revealed guidance to creational decree,^[12] and dismiss it as a “foreign conflict of no concern” or as “personal differences”, without a right and a wrong, and a Sunnah and opposition to it, and an oppressed and an oppressor, then they might as well dismiss all prior refutations, clarifications and positions taken against similar violations by Khārijites, rebels and activists as “fitnah” involving “foreign affairs of no concern”.

The resources below from Shaykh ʿAlī—which he started to make public through social media over a year ago in August 2025—would ordinarily have been conveyed and spread as they appeared, in a timely fashion, just as in all previous tribulations after the era of advice, attempts at private resolution and patience had been exhausted.

With timely conveyance of relevant information, Salafīs are able to evaluate the evidences of the critics and determine where the truth lies, without partisanship to any particular shaykh, whether for or against, whether the critic(s) or the critiqued, and, as Shaykh Rabīʿ said, speak with what they hold to be the truth (see also: Shaykh Bin Bāz on upholding truth in fitnah when it becomes clear). There is no place for intellectual terrorism and exaggerating statuses to give them immunity from justified criticism, as Shaykh Rabīʿ also explained.

It is this consistent policy—especially in matters pertaining to clear foundations which have already been settled in the Book, the Sunnah and the methodology of the Salaf—which led to unification of understanding, swift ending of doubts and protection of the daʿwah in all previous tribulations due to the collective understanding fostered through timely conveyance of important information and clarifications from scholars and shaykhs, after they exhausted patience and advice, regarding foundations of the Sunnah. This is the only basis for unity, strength and resilience in the face of controversy.

These resources aid in facilitating the fulfilment of the Sharīʿah objective such that Salafīs can do what they are supposed to do when controversies arise between two parties (regardless of their status), which is to investigate the truth to see where and with whom it lies and then speak with it in support of truth and its people. This is the only way to end any fitnah and fulfil the legislated Sharīʿah objective. Otherwise, confusion and uncertainty prevail, sowing the seeds of division in the ranks.

Two Disturbing Aspects of the Fitnah

As mentioned above, Shaykh ʿAlī warned against the political factions (aḥzāb) and their desire to split Yemen. He saw deception and treachery towards senior scholars in matters of rulership, war and bloodshed and alignment with the STC rebels from certain shaykhs whose advocate was ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī. Outwardly, they made a display of disavowing Hani Burayk, but their activities were aligned with his objectives.

Shaykh ʿAlī was attacked, ridiculed and oppressed for many years for this sound position (backed by senior scholars and official Saudi regional policy), and despite repeat attempts to establish truth and seek justice, he was ignored. The shaykh whom he thought would respond positively by advising and restraining ʿArafāt and the Aden shaykhs from their harmful activities, belittled and humiliated him instead, while shielding the transgressors who were violating foundations of the Sunnah.

Then, when Saudi forces attacked the rebels in late December 2025 and put an end to their activities and the secessionist project, the shaykh in question was led by the circumstances to express the same position that Shaykh ʿAlī had called to and remained firm upon for six years or so, and for which he was belittled and humiliated, and without any clarification or apology.

During these events, there were violations of foundations of the Sunnah, as well as treachery to senior scholars and great oppression against the one who spoke and aided the truth. Yet today, despite having given rulings and engaged in activities that weakened the nation and compromised its ability to stand against the Houthī threat, they are pretending as if nothing happened and that they are blameless.

This is one part of the fitnah, the errors and violations, which include:

• giving fatwā for fighting against legitimate authority,
• inventing false principles regarding rebellion to justify al-Zubaydī’s treachery and rebellion,
• inventing false distinctions which lend to the ideological justification of the creed and methodology of the Khārijites,
• implying the illegitimacy or lack of standing of Muslim governments and nations, claiming that they remain colonised, until they “apply the religion”,
• applying the sūrah regarding the Hypocrites to a Muslim government and its forces while praising the victories of a rebellious Khārijite faction
• and more.

These errors integrate with and compound each other and provide the ground for further developments, indicated the tremendous danger. And this is how innovation and misguidance appear, as something trivial, and those who recognise it from a distance and warn from it are seen as agitators, troublemakers and so on.

Further—and this is the other most serious part of the fitnah—their actions showed that honourable Salafī shaykhs who stood by the Sunnah and aided the truth are expendables who can just be trashed when their persistence upon truth becomes an inconvenience and annoyance. Further still, that status, position, trust, perceived authority and group consensus can be abused to isolate, silence and trample upon a Salafī shaykh who has truth on his side, and seeks nothing but goodness, protection and safety for Muslims through sound, evidence-based positions. Such a shaykh can be presented as an isolated loner, a troublemaker who broke away, held fringe views against group consensus, motivated by personal revenge.

This is what they did with Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥudhayfī while noting that this is not an isolated incident, but a recurring pattern of behaviour across different events,^[13] which turns it into a matter of great urgency due to its tremendous harm to the unity and integrity of the Salafī daʿwah across the world. This is not the way of the Rabbānī scholars and this is not how Ahl al-Sunnah are treated. Indeed, this behaviour indicates that there are deeper issues.

When ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī and his clique perceive challenge and non-compliance they resort to ad hominem attacks and trawl for the slips and mistakes of the critics out of vengeance and malice to create distractions and side-shows away from the original core issues. Since the beginning of this year (2026) when these violations of ʿArafāt and his clique had surfaced and had been thoroughly exposed, there has been a concerted campaign to prevent this knowledge from reaching the awareness of Salafīs, both students and those besides them.

This is a very disturbing development in the daʿwah and unless it is highlighted, exposed and rejected by the bulk of Ahl al-Sunnah, the unity of Ahl al-Sunnah will be compromised. Indeed, it has already been harmed greatly by this orientation, against which a sufficiently deterring stance and iron-clad position has not been taken. It is extremely important to note that these lingering, unresolved issues provide the fertile ground for the splintering of Ahl al-Sunnah.

Resources from Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥudhayfī

Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥudhayfī is one of numerous shaykhs who have openly spoken about the harmful consequences of the failure to live up to scholarly standards and expectations with just and merciful dealings and the failure to restrain corrupt individuals such as ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī from his mischief. These critiques of Shaykh ʿAlī and others have been available and spread since late 2025, inclusive of English translations which were made by others and posted on social media.

However, great efforts have been made to portray this speech involving foundations of the religion and scholarly responsibility as hate crimes and conspiracy to bring down “scholars”, meaning, the one or two shaykhs who have been subject to justified criticism, and there has been much selective outrage and intellectual terrorism used against Salafīs, students of knowledge, callers and their communities.

However, every show has to come to an end after it becomes too repetitive, predictive and boring, and we are at the stage where people have had enough and just want the truth through straight facts and answers.

The list of resources from Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥudhayfī serve as a reference point for tracking and tracing the chain of events and the underlying issues for whoever desires to arrive at the truth of the matter. The reader should note that there are legitimate questions raised requiring meaningful knowledge-based answers addressing the substance of the issue and not defamation, character assassination and creating side-shows.

While most of these resources are in the Arabic language, there are English translations for some of them. Short summaries or comments have also been provided for many of the resources. Some of these resources are very important and contain key information, such as the Transitional Council Shaykhs, Ṣalāḥ Kantoush calling for splitting Yemen and going against Saudi policy (see here and here), Kantoush endorsing and strengthening a statement of support for the rebel ḥizb, and describing it as sensible and in accordance with Salafī foundations (see here) and Shaykh ʿAlī’s response to the pathetic attempts of Ṣalāḥ Kantoush in justification of seditious activities, 15 reasons why Shaykh ʿAlī and the Salafīs left the Aden Shaykhs, and another brief explanation. It should also be noted that ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī is an established liar, that is no longer contestable, and others (Kantoush, Zakariyyā bin Shuʿayb) also tell lies, and this has to be taken into consideration with respect to their writings and doubts.

You can view just the resources below on a separate page .

1. Shaykh Muqbil bin Hādī (رحمه الله) on the importance of the unity of Yemen, cited by Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥudhayfī (here):^[14]

   (فلعل الله- سبحانه وتعالى - يوقظنا معشر اليمنيين ، فإن اليمن واحد، وما قسمته إلا السياسات المنحرفة، وما قسمته إلا الأهواء) “Perhaps Allāh (سبحانه وتعالى) will awaken us, the people of Yemen, for Yemen is one, and it was divided only by deviant politics, it was divided only by desires.”

2. Reports regarding ties between Aidarous al-Zubaydī, Irān and the Houthīs, here and here (04/09/2014).
3. Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥudhayfī Raising the Affair of Hānī Burayk and the Goal of Secession from Yemen to Shaykh Rabīʿ bin Hādī: Image. Taken from his written advice to Hāni, “Mā Hākadhā Tūrad al-Ibil Yā Hāni”.

   Shaykh ʿAlī raised the errors of Hānī Burayk to Shaykh Rabīʿ who requested Shaykh ʿAlī to advise him against his secessionist agenda (in the south of Yemen), as it would entail allowing the north to be left to the Rāfiḍī Houthīs.

4. Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥudhayfī on the Transitional Council (2019): Article (19/12/2019).

   An article from 2019 explaining that the separatist Transitional Council is a ḥizb (political faction) calling for the splitting of South Yemen and should not be joined or supported. ShaykhʿAlī was belittled and attacked for this position. It should be kept in mind that during the late 20th century the Salafī daʿwah has revolved heavily around rejection of these aḥzāb, their methodologies and activities and many, if not most of the tribulations involved violations pertaining to rulership, obedience and rebellion.

5. Advice to Aḥmad Bādukhn Not to Delve into Matters of War and Bloodshed: Post (19/05/2020).

   All of these dubious characters who became vocal recently were given sound, legislatively correct advice in serious matters many years ago, and they are just resentful for that. They have attracted and drawn the support of like-minded people from various other countries who are oblivious to these historical realities. More on Badukhn here, Shaykh ʿAlī called him a lowlife and you will see why.

6. Salāḥ Kantoush openly opposing unity in Yemen, the fatwa of Shaykh Rabīʿ and official Saudi policy: Post (24/06/2021) and see a fatwā he gave here.
7. Shaykh ʿAlī al-Hudhayfī: ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī is a Liar: Article (25/08/2025).
8. Unveiling the Deception of Those Who Misguide: Article (29/08/2025).

   Shaykh ʿAlī responds to the deceptive claims of “Abū ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Salafī” who he later identifies as ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī (see further below). In the overall scheme of things, these doubts were spread to counter the clarity that Shaykh ʿAlī was bringing, as it ran contrary to the political ambitions of ʿArafāt and the Aden shaykhs.

9. Comment Regarding Fighting With the Ruler Against the Bughāt: Post (12/12/2025). English translation.

   Note: The affairs of jihād, war and fighting return to the opinion and speech of the ruler, and it is not the case that these affairs must be returned to scholars first for fatwā, especially when the matter is clear, such as when Khārijites, rebels and mercenaries try to seize power. When the ruler makes the decision in these affairs and summons the army (istinfār), the scholars and people of authority must rally behind him, and the people make jihād behind him whether he is righteous or sinful. This is a foundation in the Sunnah which some people have tried to cast doubt upon to justify their own errors and deviations in the subject matter.

10. Debating Abd al-Ilah al-Rifāʾī: Part 1. Questions posed to ʿAbd al-Ilāh al-Rifāʿī to explain his past and confirm that he used to be a Quṭbī, and why he as a youngster, puts himself forward in great affairs. His ignorance and oppression are highlighted.
11. Exposing the Scheme of ʿArafāt and Ṣalāḥ Kantoush in Trying to Conceal the Issue of Communication with Hānī Burayk: Audio (20/12/2025).

    Evidence has proven a line of communication between the Aden shaykhs and Hānī Burayk, and though they claim they are free of him in the open, their activities were oddly aligned with his goal of secession and the split of South Yemen.

12. Debating Abd al-Ilah al-Rifāʾī: Part 2 (26/11/2025). A refutation of numerous lies from this individual and an explanation of the just and merciful approach of Ahl al-Sunnah towards Ahl al-Sunnah which contrasts greatly with the way of ʿArafāt and his clique.

    One should note the disturbing pattern here. Al-Rifāʾī has been revealed to have a past with the Ikhwānīs and extreme Ḥaddādīs, and ʿArafāt has made alliances with Ḥaddādīs like Hishām al-Beily and Bādukhn is described as a Ḥaddādī and a lowlife (see details further down).

13. Regarding the Ruler Who Conquers a Land: Post (28/12/2025). A similar short post.
14. The Ruling on Fighting in Sudan Against the Rebels: Article (27/11/2025). A refutation of the claim that the ruler, his army and subjects must refrain from fighting rebels and transgressors until they ask the scholars, and that such fighting is fighting of “fitnah”.

    Note: Shaykh ʿAlī Ḥudhayfī wrote this in support of the leadership of Sudan against rebel forces and mercenaries and in support of Shaykh Nizār bin Hāshim who tried but failed to get Shaykh al-Bukhārī to provide a clear ruling regarding it after he had publicly undermined the religious and political authority of the country.

15. A Question to the Ḥaddādī Aḥmad Bādukhn: Statement (12/12/2025). View as image.
16. Dr. ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī and His Gang: Statement (06/01/2026). English translation. A list of their violations and oppositions to the Sunnah.
17. Wanted for Treason: How Aidarous al-Zubaidi Betrayed Yemen and His Own Cause: News report (07/01/2026).
18. ʿArafāt and His Gang Warning Against Shaykh ʿAlī and Misleading Youth: Statement (09/01/2026). English translation
19. Regarding Past Tazkiyahs Which are Invalidated by a Person’s Deviation: Audio (10/01/2026).
20. A Call to Self-Reckoning and Returning to the Truth Directed to the Errant Shaykhs of Aden: Statement (20/01/2026). English translation. This article explains how the daʿwah was harmed in Aden and the deviations from the Sunnah which occurred.
21. Letter of request to Shaykh al-Bukhārī to deal with ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī: Letter (05/02/2026). This is the fourth time Shaykh ʿAlī has asked Shaykh al-Bukhārī to rein in the harm and corruption of ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī.
22. ʿArafāt is the Cause of These Tribulations: Article (05/02/2026).
23. A Letter of Advice to the People of the Liberated Areas: Article (07/02/2026).

    A letter calling to people who live in free (uncaptured or recaptured) areas to be grateful and not to be deceived by political calls and to respect Saudi Arabia and its role in the region and not to speak ill of its rulers and scholars.

24. Evidences Regarding the Shaykhs of Aden and the Transitional Council: Article (12/02/2026).
25. Testimony Regarding ʿArafāt’s Lie About the Fatwā for Fighting: A Madīnah University Student Addresses ʿArafāt and His Lies and Corruption: Post (02/02/2026)
26. “Fear Allāh O ʿArafāt”: Post (12/02/2026). A follow up to the previous testimony.
27. Shaykh al-Bukhārī and the Visit of the Adenī Shaykhs to See the Rebel al-Zubaydī: Article (14/02/2026). English translation.

    Note: This helps to explain why ʿArafāt and Kantoush were exaggerating in the status of Shaykh al-Bukhārī and nurturing Salafīs upon the notion that the world's problems and disputes should be returned back to him. Shaykh Rabīʿ’s fatwā was for them to remain with the Saudi coalition, which was not in line with their ambitions. In contrast, Shaykh al-Bukhārī gave fatwā for fighting legitimate government, allowed the Aden shaykhs to meet with the rebel leader, and supported them against Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥudhayfī who had foiled their scheme to mislead Shaykh Rabīʿ into supporting their ambitions.

28. A Letter to the Just People: Article (15/02/2026). Addresses the failure in duty of Shaykh al-Bukhārī and transgressions of ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī. An excerpt from it: Questions to Ask Shaykh al-Bukhārī (English & Arabic).
29. Selling for Worldly Gain, Hānī Burayk's Money and the Reality of the Shaykhs of the Transitional Council: Post & Media (01/03/2026). English Translation
30. Advice to Students of Knowledge in Holland: Article (02/03/2026). Regarding Muḥammad bin Khalīfah, one of ʿArafāt’s supporters, and his open revilement of the Gulf states.
31. Comment on the letter sent to Shaykh al-Bukhārī on 5 February 2026: Comment (26/03/2026). A series of questions directed to Shaykh al-Bukhārī after his repeat failures to protect the daʿwah from his companion and associate, ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī. English translation.
32. A Reply to ʿArafāt’s Claims Regarding Avenging Oneself: Post (26/03/2026). English translation. A response to those who say that when someone is lied upon and oppressed that he is taking things “personally”. Shaykh Rabīʿs words on aiding the oppressed and “personal difference”.

    Note: This is something that people have also accused me of. However, when these affairs regarding complicity in rebellion and sedition, conspiring to deceive senior scholars in matters of war and bloodshed, and allying with Ḥaddādī innovators against Ahl al-Sunnah began to surface in the second half of 2025, it became clear that what ʿArafāt did with respect to me was only a warning sign of the deeper underlying corruption and a reflection of his past, something I maintained from the beginning, and it has been proven true. At this stage, my issue became less important and was just one aspect of many in the harm of this individual against which a firm, unequivocal and uncompromising stance was necessary in order to protect the daʿwah. Pursuing this stance, given that many other violations are involved, does not amount to “taking things personally”.^[15]

33. Questions to Shaykh al-Bukhārī: Post (26/03/2026).
34. On ʿArafāt Attacking Salafīs and Praising Innovators: Comment (30/03/2026). Highlights a false principle of this group which is that despite someone making tabdīʿ of Salafīs and waging war against them while praising misguided innovators (a clear violation of foundations), we should turn a blind eye to it and raise the affair to Shaykh al-Bukhārī to investigate and judge in instead!

    Shaykh ʿAlī said: “It is allowed for ʿArafāt to warn against Alī al-Hudhayfī, and to declare Abu ʿIyaaḍ al-Brīṭānī an innovator, but at the very same time he can praise the Ḥaddādī Hisham al-Beily despite being informed of what he has of deviations.”

35. ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī is a Plant Among Salafīs: Post (30/03/2026). This statement is made based on the direct, first-hand experience of Shaykh ʿAlī with this individual and many supporting evidences.
36. A Response to the Biased Advice From French Brothers to the Salafīs of Egypt: Audio (01/04/2026). A written comment, summarising the reality of what they are saying.
37. Destroying the Doubts of Kantoush: Part 1 Article (06/04/2026). A response to what was written by Kantoush “Kashf Shubuhāt al-Tashwīsh ʿalā Mashāyikh ʿAden” in which he attempted to defend and excuse their complicity in supporting rebellion and secession through feeble but dangerous arguments.
38. Cautioning Ahl al-Sunnah from Oppression Which is Layers of Darkness on the Day of Judgment.: Audio and Article (07/04/2026). A warning against those who attack people merely for pursuing a right or finding objection with those who oppose foundations of the Sunnah.
39. I Do Not love Cutting of Ties: Article (08/04/2026). An exposure of ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī and the ghuluww in Shaykh al-Bukhārī. A translated excerpt from the article.

    From the very end of the article: “ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī wishes to divert people away from these dangerous subjects (i.e. complicity in rebellion, sedition, bloodshed) to the subject of Shaykh al-Bukhārī, so I don’t know, is Shaykh ʿAbd Allāh al-Bukhārī more important to ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī than the foundations of Ahl al-Sunnah?” This has been of their most powerful tactics, which is to deflect and divert everything to the issue of Shaykh al-Bukhārī, portraying him as untouchable and any critical speech about him as a hate crime, and using this as a shield for themselves, to avoid having to respond in substance. Though Shaykh ʿAlī called out this strategy, many continue to fall victim to it.

40. Ahl al-Sunnah Do Not Revile the Scholars of Ahl al-Sunnah: Article (14/04/2026). English translation. A refutation of the claim that just because a person, a common person even, has an issue, a difficulty with one shaykh, and pursues his right, that somehow he is reviling “the scholars”, as if that one shaykh embodies “the scholars”.

    Note: The above three materials (audio and two articles) were put out by Shaykh ʿAlī all within about a week after ʿArafāt and his followers created selective outrage about an article of mine (incomplete at the time) on South Yemen which was shared without my permission and an Arabic translation of which was posted by Shaykh ʿAlī on his Telegram channel on 3 April 2026.^[16] Shaykh ʿAlī saw through the intellectual terrorism, never stepped on the back foot, protected the scales from corruption by recalibrating them to where they should be in light of truth, facts and justice, which is rejection of oppression (ḍhulm), rejection of the exaggeration (ghuluww) in Shaykh al-Bukhārī and making him a miḥnah (test) for people, and refocusing on the violations of foundations which lie at the heart of the matter and are the origin of the fitnah. Effectively, he stood by the position he had conveyed in his own speech and writings which were already in the public domain in any case, translated and spread on social media by others, and which was reflected in my article.

    Listen to the audio which Shaykh ʿAlī put out as his first response to the selective outrage to see how he put veneration of the foundations of the Sunnah, and of truth and justice, over and above optics and appearances, and defended the standing and honour of those who are on the side of truth. Shaykh ʿAlī: “Very sadly, you find now in the daʿwah of Ahl al-Sunnah one who warns against a Salafī and wages a vicious war, in the Arab and the Western lands… and in every place against a person who spoke against an individual from the mashāyikh. Yet you remain silent about the one who deviated from the foundations of Ahl al-Sunnah, so he aided the political factions, rebelled against the rulers, and participated in bloodshed, and strove to divide Yemen, on more than one occasion. Some people remain silent about the oppressor through the (claimed) proof of wisdom. Your silence about the oppressor is not wisdom, it is cowardice… There is no proof for the one who knows the truth and remains silent.”

41. Shaykh Rabīʿ on Taqlīd of Scholars: Post (20/04/2026).

    Shaykh Rabīʿ said: “It is easy (i.e. a light matter) for you to say: ‘Abu Ḥanīfah erred’, ‘Mālik erred’, ‘al-Shāfiʿī erred’, and ‘Aḥmad erred’, but it is very difficult for you to say ‘Shaykh so-and-so erred.’”

42. It is Impermissible to Support Anyone Known to Have Serious Deviations Whether They Are In Creed or Methodology or Their Like: Article (26/06/2026). English translation. Addressed to those who cooperate with those who have serious violations in methodology.
43. Regarding Hishām al-Beily and Those Who Accommodate and Shelter Him: Posts (03/07/2026).
44. A false argument used by the followers of ʿArafāt to defend Hishām al-Beily: Post (05/07/2027). They claim that the vile attacks of al-Beily against Shaykh Ḥassan bin ʿAbd al-Wahhāb are like the speech of Imām al-Dhuhlī against Imām al-Bukhārī.
45. Those Who Accuse Our Scholars of Irjāʾ: Article (06/07/2026). English translation. An informative 70 minute lecture on the topic of Shaykh al-Albānī and the accusation of Irjāʾ.
46. Advice to Fuʾād al-Zintānī (Regarding His Unjust Attacks Against Salafīs Due to Taʿaṣṣub to Dr. al-Bukhārī): Article (27/07/2026). Summary in English.
47. On the False Principle of ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī Regarding Khurūj If It Comes From Within the Government Power Structure: Audio (08/08/2026). An audio from Shaykh Nizār bin Hāshim. Read a summary of the issue, and a brief explanation in Arabic.
48. Everyone Can Call to Unity and Brotherhood, But Those Who Stand for the Truth Are Very Rare: Post (30/08/2026).

    This is a response to those who, when clarity, support for truth, and saying a truthful word is required, call instead to unity and brotherhood, making it appear as if the two matters are opposites.

49. Regarding The Two Factions That Entered Aden: Post (31/08/2026). Shaykh ʿAlī refutes the claim that he encouraged fighting against the government. An audio clip addressing the liars and clarifying the issue in a bit more detail.
50. Removing Some Deceptions: Article (31/08/2026). A response to the online pseudonym “Ibn Abī ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Salafī” (which appears to be ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī). This is a known practice of his from the days of the fitnah of al-Ḥajūrī.
51. On the Traitor ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī Using Online Pseudonyms and Betraying His Ruler: Post. (01/09/2026) English translation.
52. Those Who Deny the Reports of the Trustworthy and Their Testimonies Regarding ʿArafāt: Audio (02/09/2026). English translation and the original question.
53. Regarding the Doubt That a Scholar is Not Required to Speak in An Issue: Posts (04/09/2026). Shaykh ʿAlī clarifies a doubt regarding scholarly responsibility. There is also some speech from Shaykh Rabīʿ in his refutation of Ibrāhīm al-Ruḥaylī in which this doubt is refuted.

    Shaykh Rabīʿ bin Hādī (رحمه الله) said:^[17] “It becomes clear from this that the request of many students who affiliate with the Sunnah for the scholars to clarify their position is truth and correctness, if the existence of this request is ascertained (i.e. that they have indeed made such a request). It is not to be counted among the errors. That (which is true and correct is) that the errant person is the one who declared them to have erred (for their request), and that the silence of the scholars at the time of need or necessity to clarify the truth is from concealing knowledge and from the great error which results in many harms (mafāsid), tribulations (fitan) and people being split into two or many groups, arguing and boycotting each other.”

54. Falsification of the Attempt of Fuʾād al-Zintānī to Excuse the Aden Shaykhs’ Support of the STC Rebel Forces: Posts (05/09/2026). Official government statements proving that support was given to rebels after the ruler's warning.
55. Response to Shaykh al-Bukhārī’s Answer to a Question on Criticising Rulers of Other States: Posts (16/09/2026). Response to a six minute audio in which Shaykh al-Bukharī finally breaks his silence and speaks about Shayk Nizār and the matter of Sudan. Highlighting the contradictions between Shaykh al-Bukhārī, ʿArafāt and their followers. ʿArafāt says it is permitted to speak if authorised by one’s ruler to do so, which is the basis for Shaykh Nizār’s speech. ʿArafāt himself has speech regarding Turkey and Erdogan (see here, here and here). Same with Muḥammad bin Ghālib al-ʿUmarī and Munīr al-Saʿdī. The difference between them is that Shaykh Nizār has the most justification to speak about an aggressor against his nation, whereas the others have little or no grounds, based on their own fatwās. Shaykh ʿAlī poses valid questions: If speaking about rulers of other nations is prohibited, then what is your view on ʿArafāt’s fatwā? And what about your fatwā allowing people to fight their own governments? Meaning, what is worse, someone speaking about a hostile foreign government or giving a fatwā allowing people to fight their own government?

    Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥudhayfī: “I asked Shaykh Rabīʿ—may Allāh have mercy on him, forgive him, and elevate his rank—about speaking regarding the ruler of another country. He said to me: ‘My view is that there is no fixed rule regarding this. Rather, it depends on weighing the benefits and harms.’ I had posed this question to our Shaykh—may Allāh have mercy on him—prior to speaking about Erdoğan, prompted by the Muslim Brotherhood’s excessive praise of him and their disparagement of other Muslim rulers.”

    Previously, Shaykh al-Bukhārī spoke very harshly about the leader of Turkey, mentioning Zionist alliance and support and actions amounting to disbelief. It is a legitimate question, are their two scales? More commentary here with an English translation.

56. If You Have No Shame O Zakariyyā bin Shuʿayb, Do as You Wish: A Refutation of Zakariyyā Shuʿayb and the Aden Callers: Audio (21/09/2026). English translation.

    A very important refutation and exposition of Zakariyyā bin Shuʿayb and his attempts in a recent lecture in Kenya to whitewash himself and the Aden callers from complicity in rebellion. He resorted to lies and fallacies which are smoothly dismantled by Shaykh ʿAlī. More commentary from Horaz al-Kurdī with an English translation. His main fallacies: a) since the government has not apprehended us, we cannot have fallen into khurūj (rebellion), b) we teach against rebellion, so how could we have fallen into it?

57. Call for Dr. al-Bukhārī and others to speak up and rectify the corruption ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī has caused: Post (30/09/2026).

    Quote: “Say to Dr. al-Bukhārī to fear Allāh and issue a statement to rectify the situation of those corrupted by ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī and his associates. The daʿwah was not proceeding in this manner until that corrupting influence, ʿArafāt al-Muhammadī, emerged with such ideas. By Allāh, He will hold him accountable for this. And Dr. al-Bukhārī—as well as you—will be questioned regarding the reason for this silence.”

58. Ask Dr. al-Bukharī: Who is Responsible for Corrupting the Manhaj of the Youth? Post (01/10/2026).

    Shaykh ʿAlī wants an answer from Dr. al-Bukhārī about Salafīs who are speaking against the Saudi government and accusing it of treachery, corrupted by ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī, and why he is left alone (without censure).

59. Exposing the Obfuscation and Opportunistic Exploitation of Coalition and Legitimate Yemeni Government Victories by ʿArafat al-Muḥammadī: Post (05/10/2026).

    ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī uses evasive and duplicitous language to avoid naming (and therefore affirming) the legitimate ruler of Yemen, further exposing the reality of this clique which has resembled the attitude and approach of the Khārijites towards legitimate authority from certain aspects.

60. Regarding the Speech of Shaykh Bin Bāz About Two Warring Sides in Yemen (1994) and the Speech of Dr. al-Bukhārī Regarding Sudan. Article (11/10/2026).

    First, the fighting in Yemen at that time was between two states and not khurūj (rebellion). Second, the fighting was for worldly reasons, and not out of preservation of the unity of main body of the Muslims. Third, the victims of that fighting were the people and the poor. Further, there were already two states and there were attempts at unifying which failed and led to the fighting in 1994. As for Sudan, it is a case of a paramilitary force led by a subordinate (Muḥammad Ḥamdān Dagalo) who are fighting against the regular national and official army led by the President (Gen. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Burhān), rendering them Khārijites and rebels. They later sought to split the nation by creating a rival government.

61. Al-Zubaydī continues his seditious activities after fleeing the country, supported by Hānī Burayk. Video and screenshot. (13/10/2026).

    Aidarūs al-Zubaydī continues his betrayal and announces an independent state (one in which he is not present) at a time when there is a war with the Iranian-backed Houthīs, and attacks from Iran. After he was accused of treason, he made an appearance after ten months of absence, in a move aimed at pressurising acceptance of his secessionist project, calling for recognition of the government and constitution which he announced previously. This is contrary to the aims of the Saudi coalition which aims to unite all of Yemen by ending the Houthi control of the north, as part of a regional security policy against Iranian influence. This is the man that the STC shaykhs of Aden met with and for whom ʿArafāt made the tafṣīl (distinction), separating between the one who rebels from within a power structure (such as a minister) and the one who rebels from outside the nation, as if to justify indifference, if not support for al-Zubaydī and his project, and for these affairs (of the splitting of nations) did Ṣalāḥ Kantoush make mention of what happened between the Companions in order justify their own activities supporting rebellion, sedition and the secessionist project.

62. The Fatwas and Directives of Dr. al-Bukhārī in Muslim Lands: Libya: Post (15/10/2026). English translation.

    Further revelations which support what Shaykh ʿAlī experienced in Yemen with respect to ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī and his gang, and these are not the only examples. Causing confusion and splits among Salafīs by failing to establish justice, and giving support to the errant, or equating between the right and the errant in matters of methodology and calling for silence, and treating these affairs as “arbitrations”, this is the racket that has been run to the detriment of the Salafī daʿwah and Salafī communities.

63. Ṣalāh Kantoush and His Immaturity and Ignorance: (21/10/2026)

    As the airports in Saudi Arabia are being bombed by the Houthi Rāfiḍah, in a critical phase of the war, the traitor al-Zubaydī is using this situation for political leverage, to pursue the same secessionist goals in the South that the Saudi-led coalition ended in December 2025 through swift military action. This move by al-Zubaydī has led to diplomatic talks between two Gulf states, and Ṣalāh Kantoush has taken the opportunity out of this development to speak against Shaykh Nizār and Shaykh Fawwāz for having supported the Saudi position of a united Yemen, which Kantoush was against, aligning with the goals of al-Zubaydī and Hānī Burayk. This is also while Hānī Burayk speaks of making peace with the Zionist state which “makes claim to the land just as Palestinians make claim to the land”. Basically, Houthī victories give them political leverage to advance their secessionist agenda for Yemen, against Saudi’s regional security policies.

    May Allāh reward Shaykh Nizār for his insight and foresight, for defending the foundations of the Sunnah, and for defending the stability of the peninsula, which is the heart of Islām, from the schemes of the schemers, whether the people of disbelief, or the Rāfiḍah, the Khārijites and the Ṣūfiyyah, and the various alliances they have with each other.

64. Preserving the Unity and Security of the Muslims (in a State) is From the Sharīʿah Objectives: Article (23/10/2026). A refutation of Asʿad al-Zaʿtari and his grave errors in the matter of rulership, rebels and rebellion. English translation.
65. More to be added in accordance with developments...

What is at Stake Here?

As the reader can see, this is not just some personal difference, or foreign politics of no concern. Rather, it relates to mighty foundations of the religion, which include matters of rulership, rebellion, sedition, and treatment of both Ahl al-Sunnah, Ahl al-Bidʿah and those for whom deviation from the foundations has been proven, whether in speech or deed or both. The Prophetic Sunnah and the Salafī methodology are not theoretical discussion points but provide rulings, judgements and practical guidance for real life events and the people involved in them.

Preoccupying legitimate authority with rebellion, sedition and attempting to split a nation that is already troubled and besieged (Yemen) leads to tremendous harm for Islām and Muslims and can compromise the nation’s future stability and ability to defend itself from external foes. Indeed, this secessionist project supported by hostile foreign players has preoccupied the country and compromised its ability to withstand Allāh’s enemies, the Rāfiḍah. Further, the effect is not limited only to that nation, but to the entire region, especially in the Gulf, and inevitably involves religious, economic and security issues.

Shaykh Rabīʿ bin Hādī (رحمه الله) said:^[18]

Allāh legislated these affairs in the Book and in the Prophetic Sunnah with His all-encompassing knowledge of what He created and what He decreed to occur among His servants. The preservation of the religion and the world lies in these legislated affairs. Those who supported rebellion, sedition and secession in South Yemen, and now bring fiery speech against the Houthīs, then they are hardly to be taken seriously after their complicity in these matters has played a role in weakening the nation.

The other thing at stake here is the just and merciful dealings that we have known historically from the Rabbānī scholars, and their love for the daʿwah and its callers, and their desire for its strength and unity. Sadly, while it was hoped there would be some continuity in this regard after the passing of the senior scholars like Shaykh Rabīʿ and Shaykh ʿUbayd, we have seen the opposite. Instead, we have the very ghuluww that Shaykh Rabīʿ condemned, we have seen extremely harsh, oppressive judgements against well-known Salafīs on flimsy grounds, and likewise, just to shield statuses and personalities from justified criticism, splitting and enmities have been seeded in Salafī communities around the world, and all of this is packaged with intellectual terrorism to keep people fearful and in line. This is a most serious matter that cannot be left untreated.

In reality, these tribulations help to separate those who pay lip-service to the foundations of the Sunnah from those who understand well that these foundations apply to real life events, and it is through those tribulations that those who hold fast to these foundations and venerate them are made distinct. This is one of the most prominent lessons to be taken from these types of events as Shaykh Bin Bāz explained regarding the Gulf Crisis.

What is strange is that the contemporary Salafī daʿwah and its clarity has been based largely around these two great methodological foundations, the first relating to rulership and the second related to Ahl al-Bidʿah and the aḥzāb. Salafī scholars, shaykhs and callers expended many efforts in clarifying these subject matters in great detail and in relation to actual events and occurrences, overwhelmingly within political settings and dimensions inclusive of war and civil strife. However, this is now dismissed as “fitnah” and “foreign conflicts of no concern” and instead of clarity and supporting the truth, we hear slogans of “teaching knowledge” and “building communities” as if there is a conflict and mutual exclusion between refuting falsehood, error, deviation and the errant on the one hand and teaching and building on the other. What happened to “taṣfiyah” (purification) and “tarbiyah” (cultivation)?

And is this not the speech of Shadeed Muḥammad and his likes who spoke of “building communities “and focusing on local needs and issues and not getting involved in all these manhaj issues abroad? This is the very attitude that risks turning Salafī communities into Ikhwānī communities, when clarity and veneration and defence of the foundations of the Sunnah are thrown by the wayside.

We ask Allāh with His Beautful Names and Lofty Attributes to put an end to this fitnah and to unite the hearts of Ahl al-Sunnah upon the truth, indeed, He is powerful over that.

Note

This article represents the view of the critiquing shaykhs in the matter which is also my view, upon the approach that since mighty foundations of the religion are involved, then timely conveyance is important to limit confusion and blurring of the line between truth and falsehood. Further, the critiquing shaykhs have all made it clear that a clear position is required, especially from those who are listened to, in aid of truth and establishment of justice, so that the fitnah is quelled, given that there has been defence of falsehood, sustained hostility and stubbornness from the outset. This is in line with the consistent and uniform way of Shaykh Rabīʿ in such circumstances.

Shaykh Rabīʿ bin Hādī (رحمه الله) said:^[19]

From the daʿwah of Muḥammad (صلى الله عليه وسلم) is the ḥadīth of ʿArjafah bin Sharāhīl (رضي الله عنه) regarding rebellion, sedition and secession.

He (رحمه الله) also said:^[20]

Shaykh Ṣāliḥ al-Fawzān on Restoring Security and Stability Under Legitimate Leadership in Yemen

On 24 September 2026, the Grand Muftī of the Kingdom, Shaykh Ṣāliḥ al-Fawzān (حفظه الله) said:

Here, Shaykh al-Fawzān stressed that returning Yemen to its security and stability under legitimate authority is from the most incumbent of obligations, indicating that this is a clear legislated objective, and this echoes the fatwā of other senior scholars such as Shaykh Rabīʿ bin Hādī who advised the Yemeni people to remain behind the coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia who are in pursuit of this objective for the security and stability of the region as a whole, thereby aiding Islām.

However, those who gave rulings for fighting against legitimate government, and those who met with the rebel leader, al-Zubaydī, maintained secret ties with Hānī Burayk and gave support to the aḥzāb, the secessionist forces, are now championing this talking point, after they had been exposed for their complicity in rebellious and seditious activities. They are using a mixture of denials and bringing doubts to justify what they fell into, and this only makes the matter worse for them.

Footnotes