ABUIYAAD
Reports News Search

Resources on the Aḥzāb in South Yemen and Their Activities in Rebellion, Sedition and Splitting the Country

  1. Shaykh Muqbil bin Hādī (رحمه الله) on the importance of the unity of Yemen, cited by Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥudhayfī (here):[1]

    (فلعل الله- سبحانه وتعالى - يوقظنا معشر اليمنيين ، فإن اليمن واحد، وما قسمته إلا السياسات المنحرفة، وما قسمته إلا الأهواء) “Perhaps Allāh (سبحانه وتعالى) will awaken us, the people of Yemen, for Yemen is one, and it was divided only by deviant politics, it was divided only by desires.”

  2. Reports regarding ties between Aidarous al-Zubaydī, Irān and the Houthīs, here and here (04/09/2014).
  3. Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥudhayfī Raising the Affair of Hānī Burayk and the Goal of Secession from Yemen to Shaykh Rabīʿ bin Hādī: Image. Taken from his written advice to Hāni, “Mā Hākadhā Tūrad al-Ibil Yā Hāni”.

    Shaykh ʿAlī raised the errors of Hānī Burayk to Shaykh Rabīʿ who requested Shaykh ʿAlī to advise him against his secessionist agenda (in the south of Yemen), as it would entail allowing the north to be left to the Rāfiḍī Houthīs.

  4. Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥudhayfī on the Transitional Council (2019): Article (19/12/2019).

    An article from 2019 explaining that the separatist Transitional Council is a ḥizb (political faction) calling for the splitting of South Yemen and should not be joined or supported. ShaykhʿAlī was belittled and attacked for this position. It should be kept in mind that during the late 20th century the Salafī daʿwah has revolved heavily around rejection of these aḥzāb, their methodologies and activities and many, if not most of the tribulations involved violations pertaining to rulership, obedience and rebellion.

  5. Advice to Aḥmad Bādukhn Not to Delve into Matters of War and Bloodshed: Post (19/05/2020).

    All of these dubious characters who became vocal recently were given sound, legislatively correct advice in serious matters many years ago, and they are just resentful for that. They have attracted and drawn the support of like-minded people from various other countries who are oblivious to these historical realities. More on Badukhn here, Shaykh ʿAlī called him a lowlife and you will see why.

  6. Salāḥ Kantoush openly opposing unity in Yemen, the fatwa of Shaykh Rabīʿ and official Saudi policy: Post (24/06/2021) and see a fatwā he gave here.
  7. Shaykh ʿAlī al-Hudhayfī: ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī is a Liar: Article (25/08/2025).
  8. Unveiling the Deception of Those Who Misguide: Article (29/08/2025).

    Shaykh ʿAlī responds to the deceptive claims of “Abū ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Salafī” who he later identifies as ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī (see further below). In the overall scheme of things, these doubts were spread to counter the clarity that Shaykh ʿAlī was bringing, as it ran contrary to the political ambitions of ʿArafāt and the Aden shaykhs.

  9. Comment Regarding Fighting With the Ruler Against the Bughāt: Post (12/12/2025). English translation.

    Note: The affairs of jihād, war and fighting return to the opinion and speech of the ruler, and it is not the case that these affairs must be returned to scholars first for fatwā, especially when the matter is clear, such as when Khārijites, rebels and mercenaries try to seize power. When the ruler makes the decision in these affairs and summons the army (istinfār), the scholars and people of authority must rally behind him, and the people make jihād behind him whether he is righteous or sinful. This is a foundation in the Sunnah which some people have tried to cast doubt upon to justify their own errors and deviations in the subject matter.

  10. Debating Abd al-Ilah al-Rifāʾī: Part 1. Questions posed to ʿAbd al-Ilāh al-Rifāʿī to explain his past and confirm that he used to be a Quṭbī, and why he as a youngster, puts himself forward in great affairs. His ignorance and oppression are highlighted.
  11. Exposing the Scheme of ʿArafāt and Ṣalāḥ Kantoush in Trying to Conceal the Issue of Communication with Hānī Burayk: Audio (20/12/2025).

    Evidence has proven a line of communication between the Aden shaykhs and Hānī Burayk, and though they claim they are free of him in the open, their activities were oddly aligned with his goal of secession and the split of South Yemen.

  12. Debating Abd al-Ilah al-Rifāʾī: Part 2 (26/11/2025). A refutation of numerous lies from this individual and an explanation of the just and merciful approach of Ahl al-Sunnah towards Ahl al-Sunnah which contrasts greatly with the way of ʿArafāt and his clique.

    One should note the disturbing pattern here. Al-Rifāʾī has been revealed to have a past with the Ikhwānīs and extreme Ḥaddādīs, and ʿArafāt has made alliances with Ḥaddādīs like Hishām al-Beily and Bādukhn is described as a Ḥaddādī and a lowlife (see details further down).

  13. Regarding the Ruler Who Conquers a Land: Post (28/12/2025). A similar short post.
  14. The Ruling on Fighting in Sudan Against the Rebels: Article (27/11/2025). A refutation of the claim that the ruler, his army and subjects must refrain from fighting rebels and transgressors until they ask the scholars, and that such fighting is fighting of “fitnah”.

    Note: Shaykh ʿAlī Ḥudhayfī wrote this in support of the leadership of Sudan against rebel forces and mercenaries and in support of Shaykh Nizār bin Hāshim who tried but failed to get Shaykh al-Bukhārī to provide a clear ruling regarding it after he had publicly undermined the religious and political authority of the country.

  15. A Question to the Ḥaddādī Aḥmad Bādukhn: Statement (12/12/2025). View as image.
  16. Dr. ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī and His Gang: Statement (06/01/2026). English translation. A list of their violations and oppositions to the Sunnah.
  17. Wanted for Treason: How Aidarous al-Zubaidi Betrayed Yemen and His Own Cause: News report (07/01/2026).
  18. ʿArafāt and His Gang Warning Against Shaykh ʿAlī and Misleading Youth: Statement (09/01/2026). English translation
  19. Regarding Past Tazkiyahs Which are Invalidated by a Person’s Deviation: Audio (10/01/2026).
  20. A Call to Self-Reckoning and Returning to the Truth Directed to the Errant Shaykhs of Aden: Statement (20/01/2026). English translation. This article explains how the daʿwah was harmed in Aden and the deviations from the Sunnah which occurred.
  21. Letter of request to Shaykh al-Bukhārī to deal with ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī: Letter (05/02/2026). This is the fourth time Shaykh ʿAlī has asked Shaykh al-Bukhārī to rein in the harm and corruption of ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī.
  22. ʿArafāt is the Cause of These Tribulations: Article (05/02/2026).
  23. A Letter of Advice to the People of the Liberated Areas: Article (07/02/2026).

    A letter calling to people who live in free (uncaptured or recaptured) areas to be grateful and not to be deceived by political calls and to respect Saudi Arabia and its role in the region and not to speak ill of its rulers and scholars.

  24. Evidences Regarding the Shaykhs of Aden and the Transitional Council: Article (12/02/2026).
  25. Testimony Regarding ʿArafāt’s Lie About the Fatwā for Fighting: A Madīnah University Student Addresses ʿArafāt and His Lies and Corruption: Post (02/02/2026)
  26. “Fear Allāh O ʿArafāt”: Post (12/02/2026). A follow up to the previous testimony.
  27. Shaykh al-Bukhārī and the Visit of the Adenī Shaykhs to See the Rebel al-Zubaydī: Article (14/02/2026). English translation.

    Note: This helps to explain why ʿArafāt and Kantoush were exaggerating in the status of Shaykh al-Bukhārī and nurturing Salafīs upon the notion that the world's problems and disputes should be returned back to him. Shaykh Rabīʿ’s fatwā was for them to remain with the Saudi coalition, which was not in line with their ambitions. In contrast, Shaykh al-Bukhārī gave fatwā for fighting legitimate government, allowed the Aden shaykhs to meet with the rebel leader, and supported them against Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥudhayfī who had foiled their scheme to mislead Shaykh Rabīʿ into supporting their ambitions.

  28. A Letter to the Just People: Article (15/02/2026). Addresses the failure in duty of Shaykh al-Bukhārī and transgressions of ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī. An excerpt from it: Questions to Ask Shaykh al-Bukhārī (English & Arabic).
  29. Selling for Worldly Gain, Hānī Burayk's Money and the Reality of the Shaykhs of the Transitional Council: Post & Media (01/03/2026). English Translation
  30. Advice to Students of Knowledge in Holland: Article (02/03/2026). Regarding Muḥammad bin Khalīfah, one of ʿArafāt’s supporters, and his open revilement of the Gulf states.
  31. Comment on the letter sent to Shaykh al-Bukhārī on 5 February 2026: Comment (26/03/2026). A series of questions directed to Shaykh al-Bukhārī after his repeat failures to protect the daʿwah from his companion and associate, ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī. English translation.
  32. A Reply to ʿArafāt’s Claims Regarding Avenging Oneself: Post (26/03/2026). English translation. A response to those who say that when someone is lied upon and oppressed that he is taking things “personally”. Shaykh Rabīʿs words on aiding the oppressed and “personal difference”.

    Note: This is something that people have also accused me of. However, when these affairs regarding complicity in rebellion and sedition, conspiring to deceive senior scholars in matters of war and bloodshed, and allying with Ḥaddādī innovators against Ahl al-Sunnah began to surface in the second half of 2025, it became clear that what ʿArafāt did with respect to me was only a warning sign of the deeper underlying corruption and a reflection of his past, something I maintained from the beginning, and it has been proven true. At this stage, my issue became less important and was just one aspect of many in the harm of this individual against which a firm, unequivocal and uncompromising stance was necessary in order to protect the daʿwah. Pursuing this stance, given that many other violations are involved, does not amount to “taking things personally”.[2]

  33. Questions to Shaykh al-Bukhārī: Post (26/03/2026).
  34. On ʿArafāt Attacking Salafīs and Praising Innovators: Comment (30/03/2026). Highlights a false principle of this group which is that despite someone making tabdīʿ of Salafīs and waging war against them while praising misguided innovators (a clear violation of foundations), we should turn a blind eye to it and raise the affair to Shaykh al-Bukhārī to investigate and judge in instead!

    Shaykh ʿAlī said: “It is allowed for ʿArafāt to warn against Alī al-Hudhayfī, and to declare Abu ʿIyaaḍ al-Brīṭānī an innovator, but at the very same time he can praise the Ḥaddādī Hisham al-Beily despite being informed of what he has of deviations.”

  35. ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī is a Plant Among Salafīs: Post (30/03/2026). This statement is made based on the direct, first-hand experience of Shaykh ʿAlī with this individual and many supporting evidences.
  36. A Response to the Biased Advice From French Brothers to the Salafīs of Egypt: Audio (01/04/2026). A written comment, summarising the reality of what they are saying.
  37. Destroying the Doubts of Kantoush: Part 1 Article (06/04/2026). A response to what was written by Kantoush “Kashf Shubuhāt al-Tashwīsh ʿalā Mashāyikh ʿAden” in which he attempted to defend and excuse their complicity in supporting rebellion and secession through feeble but dangerous arguments.
  38. Cautioning Ahl al-Sunnah from Oppression Which is Layers of Darkness on the Day of Judgment.: Audio and Article (07/04/2026). A warning against those who attack people merely for pursuing a right or finding objection with those who oppose foundations of the Sunnah.
  39. I Do Not love Cutting of Ties: Article (08/04/2026). An exposure of ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī and the ghuluww in Shaykh al-Bukhārī. A translated excerpt from the article.

    From the very end of the article: “ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī wishes to divert people away from these dangerous subjects (i.e. complicity in rebellion, sedition, bloodshed) to the subject of Shaykh al-Bukhārī, so I don’t know, is Shaykh ʿAbd Allāh al-Bukhārī more important to ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī than the foundations of Ahl al-Sunnah?” This has been of their most powerful tactics, which is to deflect and divert everything to the issue of Shaykh al-Bukhārī, portraying him as untouchable and any critical speech about him as a hate crime, and using this as a shield for themselves, to avoid having to respond in substance. Though Shaykh ʿAlī called out this strategy, many continue to fall victim to it.

  40. Ahl al-Sunnah Do Not Revile the Scholars of Ahl al-Sunnah: Article (14/04/2026). English translation. A refutation of the claim that just because a person, a common person even, has an issue, a difficulty with one shaykh, and pursues his right, that somehow he is reviling “the scholars”, as if that one shaykh embodies “the scholars”.

    Note: The above three materials (audio and two articles) were put out by Shaykh ʿAlī all within about a week after ʿArafāt and his followers created selective outrage about an article of mine (incomplete at the time) on South Yemen which was shared without my permission and an Arabic translation of which was posted by Shaykh ʿAlī on his Telegram channel on 3 April 2026.[3] Shaykh ʿAlī saw through the intellectual terrorism, never stepped on the back foot, protected the scales from corruption by recalibrating them to where they should be in light of truth, facts and justice, which is rejection of oppression (ḍhulm), rejection of the exaggeration (ghuluww) in Shaykh al-Bukhārī and making him a miḥnah (test) for people, and refocusing on the violations of foundations which lie at the heart of the matter and are the origin of the fitnah. Effectively, he stood by the position he had conveyed in his own speech and writings which were already in the public domain in any case, translated and spread on social media by others, and which was reflected in my article.

    Listen to the audio which Shaykh ʿAlī put out as his first response to the selective outrage to see how he put veneration of the foundations of the Sunnah, and of truth and justice, over and above optics and appearances, and defended the standing and honour of those who are on the side of truth. Shaykh ʿAlī: “Very sadly, you find now in the daʿwah of Ahl al-Sunnah one who warns against a Salafī and wages a vicious war, in the Arab and the Western lands… and in every place against a person who spoke against an individual from the mashāyikh. Yet you remain silent about the one who deviated from the foundations of Ahl al-Sunnah, so he aided the political factions, rebelled against the rulers, and participated in bloodshed, and strove to divide Yemen, on more than one occasion. Some people remain silent about the oppressor through the (claimed) proof of wisdom. Your silence about the oppressor is not wisdom, it is cowardice… There is no proof for the one who knows the truth and remains silent.”

  41. Shaykh Rabīʿ on Taqlīd of Scholars: Post (20/04/2026).

    Shaykh Rabīʿ said: “It is easy (i.e. a light matter) for you to say: ‘Abu Ḥanīfah erred’, ‘Mālik erred’, ‘al-Shāfiʿī erred’, and ‘Aḥmad erred’, but it is very difficult for you to say ‘Shaykh so-and-so erred.’”

  42. It is Impermissible to Support Anyone Known to Have Serious Deviations Whether They Are In Creed or Methodology or Their Like: Article (26/06/2026). English translation. Addressed to those who cooperate with those who have serious violations in methodology.
  43. Regarding Hishām al-Beily and Those Who Accommodate and Shelter Him: Posts (03/07/2026).
  44. A false argument used by the followers of ʿArafāt to defend Hishām al-Beily: Post (05/07/2027). They claim that the vile attacks of al-Beily against Shaykh Ḥassan bin ʿAbd al-Wahhāb are like the speech of Imām al-Dhuhlī against Imām al-Bukhārī.
  45. Those Who Accuse Our Scholars of Irjāʾ: Article (06/07/2026). English translation. An informative 70 minute lecture on the topic of Shaykh al-Albānī and the accusation of Irjāʾ.
  46. Advice to Fuʾād al-Zintānī (Regarding His Unjust Attacks Against Salafīs Due to Taʿaṣṣub to Dr. al-Bukhārī): Article (27/07/2026). Summary in English.
  47. On the False Principle of ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī Regarding Khurūj If It Comes From Within the Government Power Structure: Audio (08/08/2026). An audio from Shaykh Nizār bin Hāshim. Read a summary of the issue, and a brief explanation in Arabic.
  48. Everyone Can Call to Unity and Brotherhood, But Those Who Stand for the Truth Are Very Rare: Post (30/08/2026).

    This is a response to those who, when clarity, support for truth, and saying a truthful word is required, call instead to unity and brotherhood, making it appear as if the two matters are opposites.

  49. Regarding The Two Factions That Entered Aden: Post (31/08/2026). Shaykh ʿAlī refutes the claim that he encouraged fighting against the government. An audio clip addressing the liars and clarifying the issue in a bit more detail.
  50. Removing Some Deceptions: Article (31/08/2026). A response to the online pseudonym “Ibn Abī ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Salafī” (which appears to be ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī). This is a known practice of his from the days of the fitnah of al-Ḥajūrī.
  51. On the Traitor ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī Using Online Pseudonyms and Betraying His Ruler: Post. (01/09/2026) English translation.
  52. Those Who Deny the Reports of the Trustworthy and Their Testimonies Regarding ʿArafāt: Audio (02/09/2026). English translation and the original question.
  53. Regarding the Doubt That a Scholar is Not Required to Speak in An Issue: Posts (04/09/2026). Shaykh ʿAlī clarifies a doubt regarding scholarly responsibility. There is also some speech from Shaykh Rabīʿ in his refutation of Ibrāhīm al-Ruḥaylī in which this doubt is refuted.

    Shaykh Rabīʿ bin Hādī (رحمه الله) said:[4] “It becomes clear from this that the request of many students who affiliate with the Sunnah for the scholars to clarify their position is truth and correctness, if the existence of this request is ascertained (i.e. that they have indeed made such a request). It is not to be counted among the errors. That (which is true and correct is) that the errant person is the one who declared them to have erred (for their request), and that the silence of the scholars at the time of need or necessity to clarify the truth is from concealing knowledge and from the great error which results in many harms (mafāsid), tribulations (fitan) and people being split into two or many groups, arguing and boycotting each other.”

  54. Falsification of the Attempt of Fuʾād al-Zintānī to Excuse the Aden Shaykhs’ Support of the STC Rebel Forces: Posts (05/09/2026). Official government statements proving that support was given to rebels after the ruler's warning.
  55. Response to Shaykh al-Bukhārī’s Answer to a Question on Criticising Rulers of Other States: Posts (16/09/2026). Response to a six minute audio in which Shaykh al-Bukharī finally breaks his silence and speaks about Shayk Nizār and the matter of Sudan. Highlighting the contradictions between Shaykh al-Bukhārī, ʿArafāt and their followers. ʿArafāt says it is permitted to speak if authorised by one’s ruler to do so, which is the basis for Shaykh Nizār’s speech. ʿArafāt himself has speech regarding Turkey and Erdogan (see here, here and here). Same with Muḥammad bin Ghālib al-ʿUmarī and Munīr al-Saʿdī. The difference between them is that Shaykh Nizār has the most justification to speak about an aggressor against his nation, whereas the others have little or no grounds, based on their own fatwās. Shaykh ʿAlī poses valid questions: If speaking about rulers of other nations is prohibited, then what is your view on ʿArafāt’s fatwā? And what about your fatwā allowing people to fight their own governments? Meaning, what is worse, someone speaking about a hostile foreign government or giving a fatwā allowing people to fight their own government?

    Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ḥudhayfī: “I asked Shaykh Rabīʿ—may Allāh have mercy on him, forgive him, and elevate his rank—about speaking regarding the ruler of another country. He said to me: ‘My view is that there is no fixed rule regarding this. Rather, it depends on weighing the benefits and harms.’ I had posed this question to our Shaykh—may Allāh have mercy on him—prior to speaking about Erdoğan, prompted by the Muslim Brotherhood’s excessive praise of him and their disparagement of other Muslim rulers.”

    Previously, Shaykh al-Bukhārī spoke very harshly about the leader of Turkey, mentioning Zionist alliance and support and actions amounting to disbelief. It is a legitimate question, are their two scales? More commentary here with an English translation.

  56. If You Have No Shame O Zakariyyā bin Shuʿayb, Do as You Wish: A Refutation of Zakariyyā Shuʿayb and the Aden Callers: Audio (21/09/2026). English translation.

    A very important refutation and exposition of Zakariyyā bin Shuʿayb and his attempts in a recent lecture in Kenya to whitewash himself and the Aden callers from complicity in rebellion. He resorted to lies and fallacies which are smoothly dismantled by Shaykh ʿAlī. More commentary from Horaz al-Kurdī with an English translation. His main fallacies: a) since the government has not apprehended us, we cannot have fallen into khurūj (rebellion), b) we teach against rebellion, so how could we have fallen into it?

  57. Call for Dr. al-Bukhārī and others to speak up and rectify the corruption ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī has caused: Post (30/09/2026).

    Quote: “Say to Dr. al-Bukhārī to fear Allāh and issue a statement to rectify the situation of those corrupted by ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī and his associates. The daʿwah was not proceeding in this manner until that corrupting influence, ʿArafāt al-Muhammadī, emerged with such ideas. By Allāh, He will hold him accountable for this. And Dr. al-Bukhārī—as well as you—will be questioned regarding the reason for this silence.”

  58. Ask Dr. al-Bukharī: Who is Responsible for Corrupting the Manhaj of the Youth? Post (01/10/2026).

    Shaykh ʿAlī wants an answer from Dr. al-Bukhārī about Salafīs who are speaking against the Saudi government and accusing it of treachery, corrupted by ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī, and why he is left alone (without censure).

  59. Exposing the Obfuscation and Opportunistic Exploitation of Coalition and Legitimate Yemeni Government Victories by ʿArafat al-Muḥammadī: Post (05/10/2026).

    ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī uses evasive and duplicitous language to avoid naming (and therefore affirming) the legitimate ruler of Yemen, further exposing the reality of this clique which has resembled the attitude and approach of the Khārijites towards legitimate authority from certain aspects.

  60. Regarding the Speech of Shaykh Bin Bāz About Two Warring Sides in Yemen (1994) and the Speech of Dr. al-Bukhārī Regarding Sudan. Article (11/10/2026).

    First, the fighting in Yemen at that time was between two states and not khurūj (rebellion). Second, the fighting was for worldly reasons, and not out of preservation of the unity of main body of the Muslims. Third, the victims of that fighting were the people and the poor. Further, there were already two states and there were attempts at unifying which failed and led to the fighting in 1994. As for Sudan, it is a case of a paramilitary force led by a subordinate (Muḥammad Ḥamdān Dagalo) who are fighting against the regular national and official army led by the President (Gen. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Burhān), rendering them Khārijites and rebels. They later sought to split the nation by creating a rival government.

  61. Al-Zubaydī continues his seditious activities after fleeing the country, supported by Hānī Burayk. Video and screenshot. (13/10/2026).

    Aidarūs al-Zubaydī continues his betrayal and announces an independent state (one in which he is not present) at a time when there is a war with the Iranian-backed Houthīs, and attacks from Iran. After he was accused of treason, he made an appearance after ten months of absence, in a move aimed at pressurising acceptance of his secessionist project, calling for recognition of the government and constitution which he announced previously. This is contrary to the aims of the Saudi coalition which aims to unite all of Yemen by ending the Houthi control of the north, as part of a regional security policy against Iranian influence. This is the man that the STC shaykhs of Aden met with and for whom ʿArafāt made the tafṣīl (distinction), separating between the one who rebels from within a power structure (such as a minister) and the one who rebels from outside the nation, as if to justify indifference, if not support for al-Zubaydī and his project, and for these affairs (of the splitting of nations) did Ṣalāḥ Kantoush make mention of what happened between the Companions in order justify their own activities supporting rebellion, sedition and the secessionist project.

  62. The Fatwas and Directives of Dr. al-Bukhārī in Muslim Lands: Libya: Post (15/10/2026). English translation.

    Further revelations which support what Shaykh ʿAlī experienced in Yemen with respect to ʿArafāt al-Muḥammadī and his gang, and these are not the only examples. Causing confusion and splits among Salafīs by failing to establish justice, and giving support to the errant, or equating between the right and the errant in matters of methodology and calling for silence, and treating these affairs as “arbitrations”, this is the racket that has been run to the detriment of the Salafī daʿwah and Salafī communities.

  63. Ṣalāh Kantoush and His Immaturity and Ignorance: (21/10/2026)

    As the airports in Saudi Arabia are being bombed by the Houthi Rāfiḍah, in a critical phase of the war, the traitor al-Zubaydī is using this situation for political leverage, to pursue the same secessionist goals in the South that the Saudi-led coalition ended in December 2025 through swift military action. This move by al-Zubaydī has led to diplomatic talks between two Gulf states, and Ṣalāh Kantoush has taken the opportunity out of this development to speak against Shaykh Nizār and Shaykh Fawwāz for having supported the Saudi position of a united Yemen, which Kantoush was against, aligning with the goals of al-Zubaydī and Hānī Burayk. This is also while Hānī Burayk speaks of making peace with the Zionist state which “makes claim to the land just as Palestinians make claim to the land”. Basically, Houthī victories give them political leverage to advance their secessionist agenda for Yemen, against Saudi’s regional security policies.

    May Allāh reward Shaykh Nizār for his insight and foresight, for defending the foundations of the Sunnah, and for defending the stability of the peninsula, which is the heart of Islām, from the schemes of the schemers, whether the people of disbelief, or the Rāfiḍah, the Khārijites and the Ṣūfiyyah, and the various alliances they have with each other.

  64. Preserving the Unity and Security of the Muslims (in a State) is From the Sharīʿah Objectives: Article (23/10/2026). A refutation of Asʿad al-Zaʿtari and his grave errors in the matter of rulership, rebels and rebellion. English translation.
  65. More to be added in accordance with developments...


Footnotes
1. Al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr Li Khuṭab wa Muḥāḍarāt wa Mawāʿiḍh (p. 38).
2. I requested many times for a clear, galvanising stance be taken against this individual in protection of the daʿwah and its strength and unity. I warned in November 2024 that this individual will not stop his scheme to undermine the Salafī daʿwah and its unity in the West. I made the same warning and request in February 2025. Then again in April 2025, then again in May 2025, then again in November 2025. Then again in January 2026 after all these other affairs surfaced—complicity in sedition, treachery to scholars in matters of war and bloodshed, shielding and praising Ḥaddādīs, ghuluww and tahazzub. Then, once again in May 2026. Sadly, none of it was heeded. A clear, open, unified stance sends the message that falsehood and oppression will never be tolerated from anyone, whatever his perceived status. When no such signal exists, then the wrongdoers are just emboldened and continue.
3. I had shared a private link to the article with someone, incidental to a discussion. He found it beneficial and important and asked if it could be shared with his mosque admin group and kept private. I agreed, but one of the people in the group misunderstood and shared it with one of Shaykh ʿAlī’s students, who then shared an Arabic translation of it with Shaykh ʿAlī and it was posted in his Telegram channel. The brother later sent me a written apology on 17 April 2026.
4. Bayān Mā Fī Naṣīḥah Ibrāhīm al-Ruḥaylī Min al-Khalal wal-Ikhlāl (p. 63).




© Abu Iyaad — Benefits in dīn and dunyā

Search

Enter your search term and hit enter.