AN ASSOCIATE of Maḥmūd al-Ḥaddād, known as ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Bāshmīl, claimed that the Shaykhs of Madīnah, such as Shaykh Rabīʿ bin Hādī (رحمه الله) were calling to a deviant political methodology in complete secrecy built upon the errors of Shaykh al-Albānī (رحمه الله). He accused them of being infiltrators, working on the inside for political objectives. He also claimed that they were following the ways of the Ikhwānīs by not making tabdīʿ of certain callers in Saudi Arabia. These Ḥaddādis had exaggeration in matters of tabdīʿ and tajrīḥ, aiming to incite discord and chaos within the ranks of Ahl al-Sunnah. To support their claims, they attached themselves to well-known scholars in Saudi because they opposed Shaykh al-Albānī in various issues, and they leveraged this attachment to attack Shaykh Rabīʿ and others. Bashmīl is from the first wave Ḥaddādīs of the 1990s, and even though Maḥmūd al-Ḥaddād is the origin, and he disappeared into obscurity after being expelled from Saudi, Bāshmīl became the main promulgator, spokesman and caller to the ideology. After them, came the second wave Ḥaddādīs in the 2000s such as Fāliḥ al-Ḥarbī, then Fawzī al-Baḥraynī and they carried on the methodology with their own infusions.

In his refutation of the Ḥaddādī, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Bāshmīl, Shaykh Rabīʿ bin Hadī (رحمه الله) said:^[1]

Notes

01  The problem of the Ḥaddādiyyah is a complex one and this is why it requires deep thought and is not for the simple-minded who do not see beyond the superficialities and judge by appearances and claims. This is because the Ḥaddādī enterprise is a means to an end and makes use of great cunning and deceit, and behind it are goals and objectives tied to politics and the aḥzāb (factions). This is why it is a mistake to take those who manifest it at face value.

02  Further, it would also be a mistake to think that there are a group of people called Ḥaddādīyyah and there are another group of people who are Mumayyiʿah, and that they are opposites who fight each other, and fight Ahl al-Sunnah separately.

Rather, each of these two orientations are simply approaches to the same or similar ends, and underlying them and driving them are many things: They can include: a) political ambitions and objectives, b) grievances, c) false principles and commitment to an ideology, d) taḥazzub and takattul, which are partisanship and amassing followers around an idea or around a shaykh, e) enmity towards Ahl al-Sunnah, f) worldly interests and other such affairs.

03  Thus, the approaches of harshness (Ḥaddādiyyah) and softness (Tamyīʿ) can be found in the same person or group of people at the same time, or may be alternated according to time and circumstances. This helps to explain some of the strangest of affairs, such as a people who speak a lot about gentleness, softness, forgiveness, unity, cooperation and so on, and then in an instance, they flip and, lo and behold, they are on the bandwagon of tabdīʿ, taḍlīl, taḥdhīr, tajdīʿ and hajar with a fiery passion.

This shows that the real drivers are not the harshness and softness in themselves, but particular interests, desires and goals which require different behaviours at different times and circumstances or towards different sets of people.

04  Shaykh Rabīʿ mentioned how the problems of the Ḥaddādīs, their tribulation and tumult require a very particular approach comprised in the speech of ʿUmar (رضي الله عنه), which is that though we ourselves do not deceive and act in a deceptive manner, we will not be deceived by the deceivers either, as if we do not understand the nature of deception. Likewise, it requires a very profound and deep understanding, and this returns to the fact that this problem is not merely about harshness in and of itself, but that the Ḥaddādī enterprise emanates out of circumstances inseparable from the affairs of politics and the activities of the aḥzāb, with hidden loyalties, hence the importance of understanding the previous point.

05  Shaykh Rabīʿ also mentioned one of the traits of the Ḥaddādiyyah which is that they make an apparent display of loyalty to the state and to the scholars. In the originating circumstances of the Ḥaddādī enterprise, it happened to be apparent loyalty to the scholars of Saudi because they had criticisms against Shaykh al-Albānī in relation to the Gulf War and other issues of jurisprudence.

The Ḥaddādiyyah targeted the daʿwah of al-Albānī and claimed that Shaykh Rabīʿ was an agent for a secretive political call in Saudi Arabia against the rulers and scholars, and hence, they spoke of “returning to the scholars” and showed apparent loyalty for the state by vehemently opposing the Surūriyyah and Quṭbiyyah, wanting Shaykh Rabīʿ to hastily make tabdīʿ of them openly to create tribulations. However, these were just instruments for their real goals.

06  The point being made is that one should be not be deceived by their apparent loyalty to the rulers and the scholars, as this is a means to an end. In reality, they would have been very quickly exposed in their claims when, say for example, a matter of war, bloodshed, security and stability arises, and they blatantly oppose the scholars and rulers, and work sedition in the land. This would reveal that their apparent respect for the scholars and rulers was not genuine and simply a means to an end, and that they say and command that which they do not do themselves when required to do so, in the most dire and serious of situations.

07  In short, whoever thinks that Ḥaddādiyyah is just about harshness in and of itself and what is associated with it of tabdīʿ, but fails to incorporate the originating circumstances and the dynamics of the Ḥaddādī enterprise as a whole will not grasp its reality and fail to make a correct interpretation of chains of events and fail to take the necessary precautions.

Allāh exposed the First Wave Ḥaddādiyyah through scholars such as Shaykh Rabīʿ (رحمه الله), and will continue to expose them through scholars and mashāyikh who are upon the same way, those who are not deceived by the deceivers.

Comprehension Exercise

What has been explained above can demonstrated with a case study of a Ḥaddādī in Egypt named Hishām al-Beily. The reader can read the document: Imām al-Albānī (رحمه الله). the Ḥaddādiyyah, Hishām al-Beily, the Topic of Īmān and Irjāʾ (10 pages), which is a follow up to an earlier document on the subject, and should note the following:

01  Targeting Shaykh al-Albānī with the accusation that he fell into Irjāʾ, having allegedly agreed with the “Ashʿariyyah Murjiʾāh”.

02  Making an apparent attachment to certain shaykhs, such as Shaykh al-Fawzān and the shaykhs in Riyāḍ, and extracting speech from them, through secret recordings, to allow Shaykh al-Albānī to be attacked so that the accusation of “agreeing with the Murjiʾah” might gain credibility and stick, while shielding oneself by saying, “But I do not say he is a Murjiʾ.” This is nothing more than an opening point to penetrate the daʿwah and make inroads.

03  Claiming attachment to Shaykh Rabiʿ, while opposing his advice and his verdicts in one’s actions.

04  Claiming to have protective jealousy for the foundations of the Sunnah by presenting ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Sīsī has having fallen into khurūj (rebellion), but in reality, using the issue out of sympathy for Muḥammad al-Mursī and his government and to attack, revile and belittle the Salafī scholarship of the land, Shaykh Ḥasan bin ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Bannā’ and Shaykh ʿAlī al-Waṣīfī, indicating the role of political motivations and sentiments in opposing senior scholarship, while feigning attachment to another group of scholars.

05  Defending, praising and accompanying deviants such as Maḥmūd al-Kūlī and Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAlīm al-Māḍī, who accuse the Salafī shaykhs of Irjāʾ.

06  Attacking and degrading those who call to adherence to the Salafī methodology in the affair of rulership, leadership, legitimate authority and issues of rebellion.

07  Scheming to use some scholars to attack and sideline others and lying to scholars or deceiving them to extract speech in order to justify one’s conduct and course of action.

08  Making oppressive tabdīʿ of Ahl al-Sunnah, prohibiting the invoking of mercy upon them, and calling for their boycott, and then boycotting and warning from those who do not agree with these oppressive rulings based on lies and misrepresentations.

Closing Note

As mentioned previously, it is important to focus on the skeletal framework stripped of originating and localised circumstances, as it allows the Ḥaddādī enterprise to be more easily recognised whenever it is in motion.

It also allows us not to fall into the trap of seeing the Ḥaddādiyyah and Mumayyiʿah as two mutually exclusive groups or categories, because it is not the harshness or softness in and of itself that is at the root and core. Rather, there is something deeper that gives rise to the application of harshness and softness as means to certain ends.

This is why you see both behaviours and approaches from the same people, either at the same time, or at different times, based on circumstances. Hence, al-Beily reviles and attacks Ahl al-Sunnah on the one hand, makes tabdīʿ of them, calls for their boycotting, but at the same time, he has close friendship with innovators who accuse Shaykh al-Albānī and Shaykh Rabīʿ of Irjāʾ. He appears to call to absence of rebellion and not going against the rulers in apparent veneration of the foundations, but in reality, it is just a means to attack others. He claims to respect and return to the scholars, but it is only out of cunning and deception, for particular ends. When it comes to the crunch, however, in a major issue affecting an entire nation, he actually opposes the scholars of his land and ignores their statements and verdicts.

Likewise, as noted earlier, it is why some people speak about softness, gentleness, brotherhood, unity, sweet melons and mangoes at one time, then with a quick change of circumstances, they are riding on the Ḥaddādī bandwagon, celebrating and revelling in tabdīʿ, tadlīl, hajar, fiery chillies and bitter colocynths, the next.

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Footnotes